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ABSTRACT

Methods of philosophical psychology can be used to analyze the concept of emotion. Distinctions exist between dispositional and occurrent emotional states. Intensionality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an emotion; thus, emotions can be appraised as reasonable (or unreasonable) and the source of intensionality can be determined. Some emotions have a propositional belief component, while other emotions have a nonpropositional (or attributional) belief component. Important distinctions should be made between the object and cause of emotions, the identity and nature of emotions, and the evidence for an ascription of an emotion and its nature. A cognitive-attitudinal component seems essential and explains both the intentionality and intensionality of emotions. (JAC)

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ON THE NATURE OF EMOTION: RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

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"On the Nature of Emotion: Research and Educational Implications"

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"On the Nature of Emotion:
Research and Educational Implications"

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I. Introduction

Educators has spent a good deal of time and research on the concepts of knowledge, belief and value. Educators have also tried to determine what the role of these concepts should be in both educational theory and practice. On the other hand, educators have spent relatively little time and research on the concept of emotion. They have spent little time in trying to determine what the role of concept of emotion should be in theory and practice.

It will come as a surprise to many, therefore, that some have argued that emotions play central role in our moral life. Some have argued emotions play a central role in understanding and responding to other people. Some have gone so far as to argue that a person is not fully human unless one has certain emotions.

In this essay I shall not be concerned with the quite plausible arguments that establish the educational importance of the concept of emotion. I shall merely assume that the concept of emotion has great educational significance. Rather, I shall address myself here to the question logically prior to any reasonable discussion of the educational role and importance of emotions. I shall address myself to getting clear about the nature of emotion itself. In particular, using methods of philosophical psychology I shall begin an analysis of the concept of emotion.

It is quite likely that each of us has had feelings of joy, grief, fear, hope, hate, love, anger, and indignation. Also, it is quite likely that each of us has recognized that other people have had feelings of joy, grief, fear, hope, anger, and so on. My list of emotions is not meant to be complete. My intention is to remind ourselves that it is quite likely that we've all had experience with emotions. Yet when one is asked to provide an analysis of the concept of emotion, one is likely to feel ill at ease in such a second-order activity. In what follows I hope to make the analytical activity seem both important and understandable. Throughout the essay I draw out educational and research implications.

First I offer some preliminary remarks about my analysis of the concept of emotion in human beings. I also distinguish between dispositional and occurrent emotional states and then restrict my discussion to occurrent emotions.

Secondly, I explain and consider the relationship between the intentionality of emotions and the intensionality of emotions. I explain why this is an important issue. I argue that intensionality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an emotion. I discuss why emotions can be appraised as reasonable (or unreasonable) and explain what the source of intensionality is. I conclude by arguing that some emotions have a propositional belief component, but that some emotions have a nonpropositional (or attributional) belief component.

Thirdly, I draw several important distinctions: the distinction between the object of an emotion and the cause of an emotion, the distinction between the identity of an emotion and the nature of an emotion, and the distinction between the evidence for an ascription of an emotion and the nature of an emotion.

Finally, I try to determine what are the conceptual components of emotion. I consider whether there is (a) a qualitative or feeling component, (b) a behavioral component, (c) a physiological component, or (d) a relational component. As a tentative conclusion I argue that a cognitive-attitudinal component seems essential to occurrent emotional states. That emotions have such a component explains both the intentionality and the intensionality of emotions.

II. Preliminary Remarks

A. The Concept of Emotion in Human Beings

Before I begin my conceptual analysis, let me describe more precisely what I take my task to be.

First, to say that someone has a certain concept is to say that the person has certain cognitive, attitudinal, and behavorial capacities and readinesses. To have a certain concept is to have certain linquistic and practical capacities, attitudes and susceptibilities which form a particular pattern. Having a certain concept should not be regarded as having a single or unity capacity. (Toulmin, 1969, pp 75-79; 1972, Chapter 7).

Having presented my general view of what having a certain concept comes to, I can offer the following interpretation of A. I. Melden's important paper "The Conceptual Dimension of Emotions". Melden writes,

> "By the same token, some of the conceptual dimensions of our concept of anger are missing when we apply it to animals who lack certain rational abilities displayed by humans. The dog's anger and hostility provoked by the appearance of the man it does not recognize, who happens, however, to be the master's business associate, may be, from any reasonable human point of view, misdirected. But it cannot be called unreasonable, since this would carry the implication that it could have been aware of the association and, hence, of the propriety of the

> man's presence.... [Human emotions], no less than beliefs, actions, and desires, are subject to appraisal as reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified.... It is essential to our concept of anger, the concept we employ with respect to human beings, that it be appraisable in these ways just as it is to our concept of belief and action." (1969, p. 216)

I would put it this way. Animals have certain capacities, susceptibilities, and dispositions which make it appropriate to attribute emotions to them. Mature human beings, however, have "additional" cognitive capacities, attitudinal reactions, and susceptibilities. (Consider, for example, these capacities: to control the emotion, to vent it, to defuse it, to be reasonable about the situation, to not think about the situation, to think about the situation, to not express it, etc...) It is the shared or similar features which entitle us to treat both animal and human cases as cases of emotion. But we must not overlook the differences in capacities between animals and human beings. Here we can go wrong in two ways: by over-generalizing from the emotions of animals or by overgeneralizing from the emotions of human beings. Both errors distort the continuities and discontinuities between human and animal emotion, and thereby they limit the scope of the explanatory theories.

The emotion of indignation, for example, can not in any literal and straightforward sense be attributed to animals. As Melden noted,

> "The terms "shame" "guilt," and "remorse" do not apply to on offending pet caught in the act, for the possibility of applying these terms requires the recognition by the offender of some norm or standard of proper behavior, and the understanding that violations of the rule are wrong and not merely unpleasant if discovered." (p. 215)

Adults have to be able to follow rules as rules and to acquire the concepts of right and wrong, just and unjust, if it is to be appropriate to say they are feeling indignant about a situation.

There are to be sure, certain innate emotional capacities for both animals and human infants. Research is needed to determine what the forms of such innate emotions are and how they are related so the more complex forms of emotions which mature adults characteristically have. I see as open questions whether a more complex emotion modifies a more simple emotional capacity and whether a more complex emotion necessarily is built upon a more simple capacity. I leave these questions to the side.

In what follows then, I shall be trying to articulate or explicate the concept of emotion that normal adults have, the concept of emotion that we employ in Western Civilization. A complete analysis and theory would, of course, be concerned with the normal adult emotions in different cultures and social systems. In general, to say that emotions are social constructions is to overstate the case. To say that for the most part, however, biology only contributes to, and sets limits upon, the social construction of emotional behavior is to state the case more adequately (Averill, 1980). Here one should compare the development of emotional capacities with the development of linquistic capacites. (See Hamlyn, 1973; Mackie, 1976, pp.209-212; Rorty, 1980, p. 119; Toulmin, 1972, pp. 451-454, p.471ff.) I leave these more general questions to the side.

B. Dispositional Versus Occurrent Emotional States

In answering questions about the nature of emotion, it is essential that one draw the distinction between the more or less long-term dispositions and the temporary or occurrent states of a person. For the emotion-words can be used in certain contexts to refer to dispositions of a person and in other contexts to refer to occurrent states of a

person. (Alston, 1967, p. 479; Pitcher, 1967, pp. 223-4; Ryle, 1949, ch. IV; Shaffer,1978, p. 180.) Some emotion-words are used primarily in the occurrent sense (e.g. frightened), some primarily in a dispositional sense (e.g. 'love', 'hate,' 'envy'), and many are frequently used in both senses (e.g. 'afraid,' 'angry'). Alston has included the following under dispositions:

1. Attitudes towards particular objects: admiration, contempt, gratitude, resentment, jealousy, hate, sympathy.
2. Dispositions to act and feel in certain ways toward objects of certain kinds under certain kinds of circumstances: generosity, friendliness, benevolence, humility.
3. Liabilities to emotional states: irritability, excitability, fearfulness.

Perhaps a fourth kind needs to be added to this list of more or less dispositional emotion-words, although it may belong in the third kind as a special case.

4. More or less shifting or transitory short-term dispositions: Depressed, happy, restless, frivolous, gloomy.

The fourth kind of case are often called moods. Are the names of moods names of emotions? As Ryle has said, the only tolerable reply is that of course they are, in the sense that some people some of the time use the word 'emotion' to refer to them. (Ryle, 1949, ch. IV. p. 104). Ryle notes that mood-words are used in characterzing the total 'set' of a person during the short term (p. 100). Many writers hold that moods can be characterized as emotional states that typically lack intentional objects (B. Aune, 1967, p. 212; G. Rey, 1980, p. 176).

Although much could be said about the similarities and differences between the kinds of dispositions are typically designated by emotion-words, I shall restrict myself to the problem of analyzing the concept of an occurrent (or temporary) emotional state. Notice, however, that the concept of an occurrent emotion state is involved, along with other things, in the concept of attitudes, the first kind of dispositions. It may also be involued in the second kind of dispositions.

One of the laudable features of much of the recent philosophical work is the detailed presentation and examination of situations or contexts in which someone has a certain occurrent emotion. I rather arbitrarily have selected William Alston's description of a case of marked fear. (Note: I is marked fear. The dictionary claims that one sense of 'passion' is 'intense or overpowering emotion.' Hence, not all emotions need be intense or overpowering. Compare 'annoyed,' 'angry,' 'indignant,' 'enraged,' 'furious.') Here's the case:

> "A man sees a funnel-shaped dark cloud approaching and realizes that it is a potentially destructive tornado. He feels frightened. Various bodily changes ensue, including increased strength and rate of heartbeat, paling, goose flesh, and dryness of the throat. These changes are reflected in his bodily sensations, which also include such things as a sinking sensation in the stomach and sporadic local chills. He has strong tendencies to run away and to protect his goods and loved ones, tendences which may or may not find expression depending on the circumstances. He finds it difficult to think about anything else or to concentrate on the work at hand." (Alston, p. 480)

I must point out that this case is only a starting point of inquiry. Near the end our inquiry may show that such a case is in someways rather atypical. A complete study , of course, must accomodate all cases of occurrent emotions and not overgeneralize form a particular case.

III. Intentionality and Intensionality

A. Senses of intentionality

Many writers have claimed that there is an intimate relationship between intentionality and intensionality. In order to evaluate such a claim one needs to draw some distinctions and layout some criteria. In this section I will briefly distinquish the various senses of intentionality from one another; in the next section I will present the criteria of intensionality and assess the claim about the relationship between intentionality and intensionality of the emotion-terms.

The first sense of 'intentional' has a history which, for example, traces back to Acquinas. As W. Kneale has pointed out, in Acquinas' technical sense, an 'intentio' is something whose being consists is being thought. An 'intentio' is to be distinquished both from the thing of which it is the 'intentio' and from the mind to which it belongs. Thus, the study of the 'intentio' is not the same as the study of the thing, and the being of the 'intentio,' unlike the being of the thing, consists precisely in its being thought (1968,pp. 73-74). Because an 'intentio' is supposed to be a certain sort of representation, the adjective 'intentionalis' is used occasionally in the wide sense of "appropriate to a representation."

There is a second and narrower sense, however, where 'intentional being' is usually equated with being an object of thought and this is the usage which interested Brentono in the late 1800's. Kneale noted that Brentano makes clear that to say something has intentional (or mental) inexistence is simply to say that someone has it in his mind as an object of thought, i.e., thinks of it (p. 74).

There is yet a third sense. As Kneale has explained, because Brentano's use of the word 'intentional' occurred in his presentation of the doctrine that mental events of all kinds are directed on objects, it came to be believed that intentional objects, i.e. objects in the old (strict sense), were so called as being the objects of an intentional or direction of the mind. And once that erroreous brief was established it was a small step to using the adjective 'intentional' of mental events with the sense of 'directed on an object.' Kneale noted that this development is to be found in the writings of Husserl and many of his fellows (p. 75).

In what follows I shall follow Kneale and use 'intentional' in the first and second sense. Here are some examples of intentional sentences: 'I hope for a cup of tea,' 'A knows that P', 'B is frightened that Q,' 'C is jealous of B,' 'D is angry with B,' 'D is angry that Q.' 'D is looking for A.' In such cases it is plausible to speak of an object of throught or of a directing of the mind on some object, perhaps linked with some overt behavior.

It should be noted that Kneale expressed the view that intentional sentences express propositions about propositions. According to Kneale, all thinking--in the wide sense which includes wanting, hoping, fearing, etc.--involves entertainment of a proposition. Kneale warned the reader about confusing internal objects of sensation with the intentional objects of thought. According to Kneale one should be unhappy when one reads in Descartes and Locke that having a pain is a kind of thinking (pp. 86, 88.). At any rate, if Kneale's view is correct, then every genuine case of 'thinking of...', 'wishing for...', 'frightened of...', 'hoping for...', 'angry at...', etc., is also a case of 'thinking

that...', 'wishing that...', 'frightened that...', 'hoping that...', 'angry that...', etc.. (Prior, p. 104) I shall return to examine critically this point in Section IIIF.

B. Criteria of Intensionality

Many philosophers have expressed that view that emotional states are intensional. Of course emotions are not unique in being intensional; rather it is claimed that many (or all) mental states (e.g., beliefs, wants) are intensional. (Aune, 1967, pp. 196-8, 292; Gordon, 1974, p. 36; Rey 1980, pp. 168, 176, 183). Indeed, R. Chisholm, following the suggestions of Brentano, has claimed that mental or psychological phenomena are uniquely characterized as being intensional (R. Chisholm, 1957, 1967; Cohen 1968; Mackie; 1975). Given that mental or psychic phenomena are intentional, the task is to formulate logical or grammatical criteria (i.e. the criteria of intensionality) so that intensionality is coextensive with intentionality (which in turn is coextensive with mentality). Thus, Chisholm has argued that the distinctions between descriptions of psychological and non-psychological phenomena coincides, in all important respects, with the distinction between sentences that have one or other of certain logical or grammatical properties and sentences that have not. These logical or grammatical properties are called intensional properties.

Let me illustrate these features of some cases of emotion:

First Criterion of Intensionality (no existential implication). Many people have been frightened of a ghost (or demon), although there are none. Many people, upon hearing noises at their backdoors, have been frightened of burglars, though there were no burglars. In contrast,

a sentence such as "Jones rode a horse" implies, if it is true, that there is a horse that Jones rode.

Second Criterion (no implication of the truth of the embedded clause or its negation). Suppose it is true that Jones is frightened that a demon will harm him. From this it does not follow that it is true (or false) that a demon will harm him. It may be the case that Smith is angry that Mary has not written him a letter, but from this it does not follow that it is true (or false) that Mary has not written him a letter. In contrast, the sentence "It is not the case that p.", if true, does imply that not-p.

Third Criterion (non-substitutivity of identically designating expressions). Suppose that Jones is frightened that the Hillside Strangler lives in his neighborhood. Suppose also that the Hillside Strangler is identical to Jones' nextdoor neighbor, Smith. From these propositions, it does not follow that Jones is frightened that his next-door neighbor lives in his neighborhood. For Jones may not know of the true identity of the Hillside Strangler. In contrast, suppose Jones accidentally hit the Hillside Strangler with his car, and suppose, again, that the Hillside Strangler is identical to his next door neighbor (Smith). Given these propositions, it follows that Jones accidentally hit his next door neighbor with his car.

Fourth Criterion (non-substitutivity of coextensive predicates). Suppose that Jones is happy that Smith gave him a pay raise and suppose that Smith has (just) smashed Jones' car in the parking lot. From these propositions it does not follow that Jones is happy that Smith has (just) smashed his car in the parking lot. In contrast, suppose Jones rode Big Jim, the ranch horse with the white and brown markings, and

suppose also that the ranch horse with the white and brown markings is the ranch horse which is an appaloosa. From these propositions it follows that Jones rode Big Jim, the ranch horse which is an appaloosa.

Fifth Criterion (non-substitutivity of truth-functionally equivalent propositions). Suppose that Smith is happy that his boss has just given him a raise, and suppose that his boss has (also) just smashed his car in the parking lot. It does not follow from these propositions that Smith is happy that his boss has just smashed his car in the lot. In contrast, if it is true that his boss has (just) given him a raise and that his boss has smashed his car, then it is true that his boss has smashed his car.

I trust my brief review of the criteria of intensionality has made it plausible to believe that descriptions of emotional states are intensional and that psychological descriptions seem to be uniquely intensional. (Note: if sentence isn't intensional, it is extensional. See A. N. Prior for a formal characterization of extensionality, p. 91.)

The significance of Chisholm's arguments that mental or psychological descriptions, including descriptions of emotional states, are uniquely characterized by the logical or grammatical criteria of intensionality cannot be underemphasized. Bruce Aune has put it this way:

> "But because it is a widely held conception among philosophers and methodologists of science, it follows that Chisholm's views about the irreducibly nonextensional character of discourse about psychological phenomena are extremely explosive. If the language of science is ideally extensional, Chisholm's view has the consequence that a science of psychology - to the extent that it is a science of the mental - is strictly impossible: there would be mental phenomena about which we could not constitute a proper science. The shock value of this statement for any empirical philosophy ought to be sufficient to indicate the magnitude of the issue that the mild words of Chisholm really generate." (p. 199)

Given the gravity of this set of issues, researches should be extremely interested in assessing the merits of Chisholm's arguments.

C. The Relationship Between Intentionality and Intensionality

In recent years Chisholm's arguments have received critical scrutiny (Cohen, 1968; Kneale, 1968; Mackie, 1975; Prior, 1968). For example, L. J. Cohen has argued that of the seven criteria of intensionality (the five I've noted about plus two newer ones), none provides a necessary or a sufficient condition for descriptions being psychological descriptions.

Consider the first criterion, no existential implication. The sentences "Any offspring of a white rat and a white mouse must be a barren albino" and "The blown fuse was possibly caused by a flash of lighting" do not imply the existence of the barren albino (or the flash of lighting). Again, that a plant requires a lot of nitrogen does not imply that a lot of hydrogen exists. Hence, the criterion is not sufficient for characterizing psychological descriptions. But it is not necessary either. Consider the sentence "Socrates knows of an honest man."

Consider the second criterion, no implication of the truth of the embedded clause or its negation. The sentence of the form "It is contingent that p" in the sense that "It is possible that p and possible that not-p" are intensional by the second criterion but they needn't be psychological descriptions. Consider also "Possibly what caused the power-cut was that a swan flew into the wires". Hence, the criterion is not sufficient. On the other hand, the sentence "Socrates knows that p", which implies "that p", shows the criterion is not necessary either.

Consider the third criterion, non-substitutivity of identically designating expressions, and the fourth criterion, non-substitutivity of

coextensive predicates. It can be shown that neither of these criteria is a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a psychological description. Here it will be helpful to consider sentences involving the term "belief" and its cognates. Consider the inference from the propositions:

(1) The detective believes no more than that the bank manager is the head of the Ruritanian spy-ring.

and (2) The head of the Ruritanian spy-ring is Mary's lover

to (3) The detective believes that the bank manager is Mary's lover.

As Cohen puts it, the point of (1) may well be lost if the inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is treated as being capable of validity. For (1) is unmistakably intensional by Chisholm's third criterion. All that is presumed is that a statement in a certain context should normally be taken to be about what it appears to be about or that reports of beliefs, like (1) and (2), should normally be taken to articulate the believer's own formulation. (Cohen, p. 132; Mackie, 1975, p. 44.) There is, of course, a non-standard sense of 'believe that'--viz, 'believes in effect that' or 'believes by implication that'--in which the inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is valid.

Let's relate these points to cases of emotions. In my example above, I said that the inference from

(4) Jones is frightened that the Hillside Strangler lives in his neighborhood

and (5) The Hillside Strangler is identical to his next door neighbor (Smith)

to (6) Jones is frightened that his next door neighbor lives in the neighborhood

is invalid. When 'is frightened that' is used in its standard sense, the inference from (4) and (5) to (6) is clearly invalid. On the other hand, when 'is frightened that' is used in its non-standard sense - viz., 'is in effect frightened that' or 'is by implication frightened that'-, then the inference is valid. We can read the non-standard sense like this:

(7) Jones is in effect frightened that his next door neighbor lives in the neighborhood.

The thrust of (7) is to take the designating expression 'Jones' next door neighbor' out of the scope of the term 'is frightened'. Perhaps, it should be read like this:

(8) About Jones' next door neighbor, Jones is frightened that he lives in his neighborhood.

Here either 'Jones' next door neighbor' or 'Hillside Strangler' designates or picks out the person about whom Jones is frightened. Similar remarks are also applicable to Chisholm's fourth criterion.

Cohen summarized the logical points in the following manner for 'belief', yet his remarks also hold for emotion-terms:

> "What seems to be the case, then, is that in its full, standard sense, a modal operator like 'he believes that' or 'he suspects that' intensionalises the whole of the following subordinate clause, but that in any particular utterance the linquistic or non-linquistic context may show, in one way or another, that the intensionalization is only partial: perhaps just the personal pronoun or tenses are non-intensional, or perhaps just the subject term, or perhaps more. Also, if the context does not provide sufficient clues to indicate partial intensionalization, we can always replace 'believe that' by 'ineffect believes that' or 'virtually believes that' and so on." (p. 134)

(Whether the type of ambiquity is syntactic, semantic or pragmatic is a question left to another time. See Cohen, p. 134; Cole, 1978.)

It can be seen, then, that a psychological description need not satisfy Chisholm's third and fourth criteria, for in certain contexts certain senses of the terms do not create intensionality of the third and fourth kind. Nor is the third or fourth criterion a sufficient condition of psychologicalness. Consider "It is necessarily true that 9=5+4" and "It is necessarily true that 9 = the number of planets." 'It is necessarily true that' is an intensional prefix but certainly not psychological at all.

Consider the fifth criterion, non-substitutivity of truth-functionally equivalent propositions. It is not a sufficient condition of psychologicalness because in certain situations causal statements also satisfy the criteria. Even if 'q' and 'r' are both true, 'p because q' may be true while 'p because r' may be false. Given what has been said about the manner in which certain prefixes partially intensionalise in certain senses but not in others, it should not be surprising that in certain contexts the use of emotion-terms allows one to substitute truth-functionally equivalent propositions without changing the truth-value of the sentence. (Recall Jones and the Hillside Strangler, #7, 8.)

Although Chisholm has proposed two additional criteria of intensionality, Cohen's examination of such proposals justifies his conclusion that only by question-begging definitions of intensionality and/or psychologicalness shall we ever demonstrate that the logical property of intensionality affords a sufficient and/or necessary condition of a proposition's constituting a psychological description (Cohen, pp. 140-2). Mackie concludes that it is better to say, along with A. N. Prior and W. Kneale, that 'intensionality' is a rather general phenomenon of which 'intentionality' provides some of the most interesting examples (Mackie, p. 41.)

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What, then, gives Chisholm's thesis its initial plausibility? It is the following set of facts. Whether a person or other intelligent creature is logically consistent or inconsistent in his thoughts, assertions, hopes, fears, commands, etc., is quite a contingent matter. Whether a person or other intelligent creature is realistic (objective or reasonable) in his thoughts, assertions, hopes, fears, commands, etc., is, also, quite a contingent matter. The sense in which any of us can accidentally or deliberately break the laws of logic or violate the principles of rationality is a very familiar one, viz. when these laws and principles are conceived of a norms or regulative rules for the construction and composition of statements or arguments, for the control and regulation of beliefs, desires, actions and emotions. But there is also a very familiar sense in which the laws of logic admit no exceptions, since logical truths hold good under all uniform replacements of their non-logical terms (Cohen, p. 141).

D. Emotions as Reasonable/Unreasonable

If one conceives of the laws of logic and the principles of rationality as norms or regulative principles for constructing and composing statements or arguments and for controlling and regulating beliefs, actions, and emotions, one can begin to see why it is appropriate to talk about the reasonableness or the rationality of emotions. Indeed, many writers has noted this aspect of emotions (Aune, p. 179; Alston, p. 484, Bergman, p. 206; Melden, p. 216; Pitcher, pp. 221, 223, 231-2; R. de Sousa, 1980). As Pitcher has put it, sometimes a person's fear is unreasonable because the object of the fear doesn't exist, but sometimes the fear is reasonable even if the object doesn't exist, providing the person has good reasons for being afraid. Pitcher listed five additional

ways (not necessarily mutually exclusive) in which a person's fear may be unreasonable (1972, p. 223).

1. His reason for being afraid is expressible in a statement which, if true, would state a good reasons for being afraid, but which is actually false, and, in the circumstances, obviously false-i.e., it would be unreasonable to believe that it is true. (baseless or unfounded fear)
2. He acknowledges that there is no danger, and yet he is afraid (irrational fear, groundless fear)
3. His reason for being afraid, although expressed in a true statement, states an extremely bad reason, or what we might call "no reason" for being afraid. (Superstitious fear)
4. The object of his fear is an unsuitable one. (a vain or neurotic fear)
5. The object of his fear is a suitable one, but his fear is too great (or too small).

Some of the conceptual dimensions of our concept of anger (or fear, etc.) are missing when we apply it to animals who lack certain rational abilities displayed by humans. For emotions, no less than beliefs, actions, and desires, are subject to appraisal as reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. It is essential to our concept of anger, the concept we employ with respect to human beings, that it be appraisable in these ways just as it is to our concept of belief and action (Melden, p. 216)

In discussing the reasonableness of actions, M. Black has argued that only actions under actual or potential control by the agent are suitable for appraisal as reasonable or not (1972, p. 51.) Yet it is

commonly agreed that feelings and emotive attitudes are not so plainly under control as actions. It is hardly fair, one might object, to call a fear unreasonable, and so to condemm it, if there really is no way to repress that fear. But Black added that its manifestation at least is more or less under control; a man beset by cowardly fears may still be able to act bravely (p. 55).

Nonetheless, in considering the reasonableness of emotional responses, the notion of conduciveness to an end-in-view will have to be replaced by something like appropriateness, although the root idea of justifiable reason will survive (Black, p. 55). This latter position has been elaborated by Ronald de Sousa in "The Rationality of Emotions." He argued that human beings learn that in certain situations certain types of features are important and certain reactions are proper or appropriate. These are called the paradigm scenarios and they play a central role in appraising emotions as reasonable (1980, p. 142f).

Black also distinguished between 'reasonable' and 'rational', saying that to appraise a person's action as unreasonable at least is to imply that the person has reasons, that he is open to reason, while to call him irrational is to imply a more severe disorder. An irrational act calls for therapy or restraint rather than for argument (pp. 49-50). (Remember, phobias are irrational fears.) The work by Rorty on explaining the unexpected conservation or inertia of emotions delimits and details the types of problems and questions to be addressed in the latter area. An account of how people succeed in changing certain emotions that they judge inappropriate or irrational appears to follow closely the more general explanation of how people change their <u>habits</u> (Rorty, 1980, pp. 121-2).

There are cases, of course, where a change in one's beliefs (or reasons for being angry) leads to the disintegration of the emotion. One might be frightened but when one comes to see the situation as harmless, one's fear is dissolved. One might be indignant that Jones stole your car, but when you find out Jones didn't steal it the indignation may cease. Perhaps all occurrent emotional states have such possibilities, but it is clear that not all emotional attitudes (or dispositions) have such possibilities. Suppose that Bob loves Carol very much. Which judgment would have this disintegrating power? What would be the specific judgment that would logically evaporate Bob's jealousy, anxiety or depression if he realized she'd been unfaithful? Bergmann has argued that if a single discovery is enough to blot out Bob's "love", then that would be a good reason for doubting that his emotion has been serious or deep to begin with. Bergmann concluded it is a mistake to hold that emotions in general can be logically annihilated with a judgement (pp. 206-7). As Rorty has pointed out, often changes in emotions do not appropriately follow changes in belief. Such emotions have a tenacity, an inertia which must be explained in other ways (1980, p. 103).

Of course, the general question still remains whether such emotions can be controlled or regulated by means other than reason, say therapy or conditioning. Further, it has yet to be decided how, far, and by what means our occurrent emotional states are controllable.

E. Source of Intensionality

When one considers what in general gives rise to intensionality, it is in no way surprising that there should be non-psychological as well as psychological examples of it. J.L. Mackie has put it this way:

> "Intensional constructions contrast with extensional ones; extensional ones are those in which we are concerned only with picking out certain things or sets of things or perhaps certain truth values; but wherever an expression is used not just to pick out things, to identify extensions, but to say something about one or more properties or propositions, so that the connotation or sense of the expression plays some special role, the construction to which it belongs will be intensional." (1975, p. 41) (my emphasis)

Mackie went on to argue that if someone sees a ghost, then he has a visual experience (associated perhaps with a belief) which is most adequately described by describing the content of each, that is, by indicating the set of properties that he takes (in part at least wrongly), or is inclined to take, as coinstantiated at a certain place and time (p. 43). If Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline, the content of his belief in the standard case is appropriately expressed by some such sentence as "There was someone who was called 'Cicero', and who was famous for this and that, and who denounced someone called 'Catiline'. We need to mention some such proposition in order to give content to Tom's belief. If we change the proposition, say by using expressions with different senses, or by using condensed formulations which surreptitiously introduce names other then 'Cicero' or Catiline', we shall of course misrepresent the belief (p. 44). We shall not have articulated the believer's own formulation. To interpret Tom's belief in the non-standard (or large scope) sense is to construe Tom's state as being "As for Cicero and Catiline, Tom believes the former denounced the latter". But if we say this, we are saying that Tom has somehow succeeded in directing his thought towards the very same individual men that we are talking about, and this may well seem to be a more remarkable achievement, and one for which further explanation is required, than merely to

have, among the contents of his thoughts, certain clusters of properties, which are ascribed, with the help of existential quantifiers, to external reality (p. 44).

In discussing or describing Tom's having an experience of a certain sort, our talk about the experience's intentional object can be no more than a way of characterizing its content. Mackie has argued that difficulties arise here because the content masquerades as a separable object. This truth holds for beliefs, fears, and so on as well as for sensations. (p. 47) (See also Melden, pp. 201, 203), Mackie, following A. N. Prior, urged that it is more illuminating to punctuate a belief sentence in the following way:

'A believes - that p'

rather than in the more usual way,

'A believes that -p'.

Prior's punction brings out that we are ourselves using the sentence 'p' to characterize, by presenting its content, A's belief-condition which is reported by the larger sentence in which 'p' is embedded (p. 47). Prior's construal suggests that a clause governed, for example, by 'believes that', or 'fears that', is used, with just the meaning it would have as a sentence on its own, to describe a state of believing (or fearing, etc).

But as Mackie pointed out, this only constitutes the problem and does not solve it. After we have understood the logical structure, we still want to know what psychological (or other) reality underlies it and is represented by it (p. 48).

F. Propositional Versus Non-Propositional Forms of Emotion

Cohen has also argued that what holds for belief statements is fairly typical of the situation. Roughly, a proposition of this kind is intensional because it is equivalent to saying something about another proposition and the degree of intensionality depends on the extent to which what is said about that other proposition requires us to consider it in all its original terms (p. 142). That is, to consider it as the person himself would have formulated it.

Kneale, too, has argued that all thinking (in the wide sense which includes wanting, hoping, fearing, etc.) always involves entertainment of a proposition. (See also B. Aune, p. 212; Rey, p. 168). That is, every case of the form 'A is frightened of...' is also a case of 'A is frightened that...', etc...

In a recent article, Robert Gordon has maintained a similar position for 'fearing'. Gordon stated that all fearing is propositional, that all fears are fears that something is (or was, or will be) the case.

> "The formula "S fears (is afraid) that P" is comprehensive enough or more precisely empty enough, to embrace the vaguest of socalled "objectless" fears, for even at that extreme one at least fears that this is something bad that one doesn't yet know about--something bad that is (or was, or will be) the case." (1980, p. 560)

If this were so, then one could straight forwardly argue that to fear that something involves cognitive and attitudinal states (p. 561).

Unfortunately, two different kinds of criticism face those who hold that emotions are propositional in form (i.e., expressions such as 'A is frightened of...' one also cases of 'A is frightened that...').

The first line of criticism comes from recent work by R. Chisholm. The difficulties arise especially over the 'he, himself' locution. Imagine the following situation. Upon entering a bus, a man (Jones) becomes frightened at another person who appeared at the other end of the bus. Jones thought, 'What a terrifying person is that, that has just entered.'. Yet, as Jones later recognized, the other person was himself, for opposite Jones hung a large mirror. In this case adapted from Chisholm's story about Ernest Mach, as Jones entered the bus he believed with respect to Jones and therefore with respect to himself, that he was terrifying. But he did not believe himself to be terrifying. The experience might have led him to say, "That man is terrifying" but prior to his discovery of the mirror it would not have led him to say "I am terrifying" (1980, p. 34).

Let's consider another situation. Suppose you are ready to leave for work and you go to your car only to find the battery is dead because someone left the lights on all night. You may become angry and annoyed, and you might say "The person who did that is stupid and irresponsible." Yet it may be that you're the one who left the car lights on, but that you have not yet remembered or realized that fact. Until you do remember, you're angry and annoyed with respect to yourself about the lights being left on. But you are not yet angry with yourself, that is, angry that you yourself left the lights on.

Chisholm has argued that such kinds of cases also show that believing cannot always be construed as a relation between a believer and some proposition. Chisholm argued that the simplest conception is one which construes believing is a relation involving a believer and a property which he may be said to attribute to himself (1980, pp. 33-34).

Chisholm has taken as his basic and undefined locution the notion of direct attribution: the property of being F is such that X directly attributes it to Y. Notice that this basic locution can be intensional for the expression in the place of "the property of being F" need not designate a property that is exemplified.

How, then, does one succeed in making other things one's intentional objects? Chisholm has argued that one does it by attributing a certain property to oneself. In indirectly attributing a property to another, one directly attributes a twofold property to oneself. The first part of one's direct attribution (that one bears the identifying relation (R) to one and only one thing) will be correct. One can attribute a property to another only if the relation R by means one attempts to single the other out is a relation that one's bear to the other and only the other. (Notice that a misattribution might be one where for some reason or another the identifying relation fails to single out one and only one thing.) The second part of the direct attribution, that one bears the identifying relation R to a thing that has the property F, may or may not be correct.

Whenever, then, we have indirect attributions the believer attributes a property (F) to the object (or thing), as the thing to which he bears a certain identifying relation. Following Chisholm, we may call the property (F) thus attributed the content of the indirect attribution, and the thing to which the property is attributed the object. Thus, the believer directly attributes to himself the property of bearing that identifying relation (R) to an object that exemplifies that content (F).

Such a formulation presupposes two things about the abilities or faculties of believers. First, a believer can take himself as his

intentional object; that is to say, he can direct his thoughts upon himself. Secondly, in so doing he is able to grasp or conceive a certain property which he attributes to himself.

Chisholm went on to argue that another kind of believing-de dicto belief-the kind which consists in the acceptance of propositions, could be conceived as a relatively sophisticated mental state, one to which we cannot attain until one has the concept of truth or obtaining (p. 38).

Chisholm also suggested that analogous remarks hold for such intentional attitudes as knowing, hoping, intending, and desiring. In each case, there is an elementary, nonpropositional form of the attitude in question in terms of which the more familar propositional conceptions can be explicated (p. 34). Perhaps the elementary form of desiring would be: the property of being F is such that X directly desires it for Y.

One important feature of attributional belief is the following. No matter how well I may be acquainted with you, it is possible that although

i. I attribute a certain property to you under one of your (identifying) descriptions, nevertheless

ii. There is another (identifying) description which is such that, under that description, I attribute the negation of the property in question to you.

As Chisholm pointed out, ordinarily when we say of one thing that it is thus believed about by some other thing, we do not specify the identifying description under which the first thing is believed about by the second. But there always is such a description and it is usually made obvious by the context of utterance (p. 37).

If Chisholm's view of the matter can be sustained, then cases of emotions need not have propositional form, but can have the more elementary nonpropositional form. The case above involving anger (or fear) with oneself shows that the general claim that all fearing is propositional is false.

There is a second line of criticism for those who hold that emotions are propositional in form (i.e., expressions such as 'A is frightened of...' are also cases of 'A is frightened that...'). This line of criticism has been put forward by A. O. Rorty (1980) and R. de Sousa (1980), who hold that emotions are best thought of as habits of attention and focusing, as patterns of salience. Although these authors were primarily interested in characterizing relatively long-term dispositional emotions, their objections might be thought to undermine not only the view that emotions are propositional in form, but also the view that emotions are propositional or attributional in form. If so, we would have to reject or modify Chisholm's account of the more elementary, nonpropositional forms of intentional attitudes. I briefly want to argue why their objections do not carry such an implication. In what follows I shall concentrate on A. O. Rorty's objections, but I believe my arguments will apply in proper form to de Sousa's arguments as well.

The issue is whether the intentional conponent of an emotion is a belief. Rorty has taken the issue to be about beliefs which are propositional in form. Rorty considered the case in which a male, Jonah, believes his editor, a female named Esther, to be peremptory. Because he believes she is peremptory, Jonah resents Esther. Yet the case is complicated by two further facts. First, Jonah does not resent the editor-in-chief, Abe, who is far more peremptory than Esther. That is,

Jonah doesn't believe that all of those in authority are peremptory. Secondly, Jonah is a rather skeptical sort of fellow, who rarely leaps to general conclusions. Thus, Jonah doesn't believe that women in authority are peremptory. Rorty concluded that is is very difficult to ascribe an appropriate, plausible propositional belief to Jonah (Rorty, pp. 112, 114).

It seems to me that such a case shows that Jonah's resentment of Esther is groundless. Apparently, Jonah has no reasons for believing that Esther is peremptory. Yet, we can still construe Jonah as attributing to Esther, his editor, the property of being peremptory. Perhaps there is a presumption that one will accept propositions or that one will attribute properties to others only if there is a reason for doing so, but people needn't conform to such normative and regulatory rules (Black, 1970, p. 30). At any rate, that Jonah resents Esther, his editor, then, can be construed as involving an attributional belief.

Rorty also argued that if the intentional component of an emotion is always a propositional belief, then the conservation of an emotion after a change of belief would always involve a (logical) conflict of beliefs. On the view that emotions always involve propositional beliefs, it becomes necessary to suppose that the person is massively successful in deceiving himself about the conflict between the belief embedded in the emotion and the belief implicit in the rest of his conduct. Rorty argued that it is implausible to assimilate all cases of the conservation of emotion to cases that involve a self-deception denial of such conflicts (p. 115).

I believe that is a forceful argument against construing the intentional component of emotions as propositional beliefs. But, I don't

think it rules out construing the intentional component as attributional beliefs. In the case at hand, Jonah attributes to Esther, his editor, the property of being peremptory. Because he attributionally believes she is peremptory, he resents her. This case seems to be quite similar to cases of phobias where a person attributes to a certain kind of insect the property of being harmful, although the person may know or believes at another level that there is no reason for such an attribution. (Perhaps attributional belief in such cases is closely related to cases of "seeing as"--the person sees the insect as harmful. It is often claimed that the 'seeing-as' locution is nonpropositional.) And here Jonah and the person with the phobia might be as perplexed as we might be to find that his attributional belief is at odds with the rationality and logic of propositional believing. But, it needn't be a case of self-deceptive denial of such "conflicts". At best, the more elementary form of believing is at odds with the more sophisticated form of believing. The distinction between propositional and attributional believing seems to mark out a difference with which we have all had some experience. And the experience seems not to require massive success in self-deception.

Of course, why the person is ready or disposed to make such attributions is a different question, one which Rorty's essay "Explaining Emotions" goes a long way to answer. But, if we construe the intentional component of emotions as attributional belief, then we shall be able to accept the various ways in which a person accepts or uncharacteristically ignores or refuses counter-evidence (Rorty, p. 116). As we've noted earlier, whether an intelligent creature is logically consistent and rational in his thoughts, assertions, hopes, fears, commands, etc. is a quite contingent matter. Here we can see that the laws of logic and the

canons of rationality, when conceived of as norms or regulative rules for the construction and composition of statements and for the control and regulation of beliefs, desires, actions, and emotions, apply in certain ways to both propos tional and attributional believing. (Perhaps Rorty and I are not as far apart as my remarks here seem to indicate. See her remarks about different levels (p. 122) and my sections V.D. and V.E. below.)

G. Summary

At this point, let me briefly summarize my conclusions. Certain facts about intentionality and intensionality have lead various authors to claim that cases of intentionality are uniquely cases of intensionality. After characterizing each of these features, I have argued that intensionality is neither nor sufficient for the intentionality of mental states.

Many writers have argued that intensionality arises in cases where we have propositions about propositions. Some have argued that all emotions have a component which is propositional in form. I have argued that these latter two claims are false and I have introduced the conception of attributional belief to account for the nonpropositional aspect. Although some emotional states may have the higher, more sophisticated propositional belief as a component, I have argued that some emotions have only the more basic, attributional belief as a component. (See sections V.D., and V.E. for qualifications.)

Investigations into the relationship between the intentionality and intensionality of emotions have lead me to the conclusion, then, that some emotions have a propositional belief as a component while some

emotions have an attributional belief as a component. Such components explain the intentionality and the intensionality which emotions have.

IV. Some Further Important Distinctions

A. The Object of an Emotion versus the Cause of an Emotion

We are now in position to ask whether the object of an emotion is also the cause of the emotion. The answer to this question is clearly no. A few cases will do to establish the point. A person (Jones) may be frightened of the demons (or ghosts), although there are no demons (or ghosts). It might have been that some friends may have played a joke on Jones by using loudspeakers, lights, and mechanical devices to lead him to think there were ghosts or demons. Without knowing about his friends' activities, Jones might reasonably have come to believe that ghosts (or demons) exist. (This is not to say that believing that P is not a cause.) Again, suppose that a person has been frightened that inflation would reach 25% in 1980, but inflation did not reach 25% in 1980. In both of these examples, the object of the person's emotion exists in thought only. There are no demons in the world; it was not the case that inflation hit 25% in 1980. Since A's being X caused B's being Y implies that A was X, the objects of the emotions in the above examples cannot be the causes.

Notice that the object of an emotion can be ordinary everyday things and persons (as is the case with attributional belief) but the objects can also be propositions (as is the case with propositional belief).

B. The Identity of an Emotion versus its Nature

It is also helpful to distinguish between the identity of the emotion and the nature of the emotion. Suppose that someone is correctly described as knowing that Hannibal crossed the Alps. Given the standard sense of knowing, one can know that P only if P is true. Thus, one can know that Hannibal crossed the Alps only if Hannibal crossed the Alps. The particular state of knowledge is identified or individuated by the fact that Hannibal crossed the Alps. But one must resist the temptation to conclude that knowing cannot be just a state of that person but must instead be some sort of phenomena having as parts both that person (and his properties) and Hannibal and/or the crossing (Rey, p. 182). As Mackie has pointed out, some psychological verbs such as 'know' and 'see' have achievement-senses. These achievement-claims must be distinguished from descriptions of 'genuine mental activity' or 'experience'. If one considers the statement "Jones is angry that Smith fired him" in its non-standard, extensional sense, then it follows that it is true that Smith fired him. Consider also, however, the cases where Jones is frightened that the demons will harm him. Here with the intensional sense of 'frightened that' the embedded clause is false. Intentional objects are not real existants in the world. Intentional objects are used by us to characterize, describe, or identify the kind of emotional experience Jones is having (Mackie, 1975, p. 46).

C. The Evidence for an Ascription of an Emotion versus its Nature

The evidence for an ascription of an emotion should also be distinguished from the nature of the emotion. In a similar way, evidence for saying that a person is lying is different from what a person's lying

comes to. We are pretty clear about what lying is and yet even with various forms of evidence it is often difficult to conclude that so-and-so has just lied. The more we know about the character, circumstances, and situations of persons who feel this or that emotion, the more we are able to specify what it is they want, what it is that they are disposed to do and how it is that they view, feel, and respond to things around them. Because of such background knowledge we may be able to tell that Jones' not giving his wife's new hairdo more than a passing glance and his not being talkative at the dinner table indicate that Jones is angry that his wife spent the afternoon at the beauty parlor rather than shopping and in the kitchen preparing the evening meal (Melden, pp. 218-9). Descriptions of emotion, like ascriptions of belief are inferences to the best explanation (Rorty, p. 107). Don't forget that one's friends or loved ones can be angry with one without one knowing that they are angry or what they are angry about. That we can't tell doesn't imply they aren't angry.

V. Further Conceptual Components of Emotions

A. A Qualitative or Feeling Component

Many writers have raised the question about whether one must feel angry to be angry. The issue is whether feeling the emotion a necessary condition for being in that emotional state. Given that it seems rather plausible that the answer is yes, perhaps it is surprising that the answer is no (Alston, p. 483; Gordon, 1974, pp. 30-1; Melden, pp. 204-5, 207; Pitcher, p. 230; Rey, p. 178). For if a person's attention is too strongly diverted to other matters, he might have an emotion without having the sensations or feelings that usually go with that emotion.

For example, a young man, P, is being interviewed for an important job and he is extremely anxious to make a good impression. In such a situation, he may be insulted by the interviewer's remark and therefore an observer might detect an icy tone creeping into P's voice when he addresses the interviewer, although there are no other signs of anger (Pitcher, p. 230; see also Melden, pp. 204-5).

At best, feelings typically accompany certain kinds of emotions. Certain emotions--hope, envy--may not even have typical feelings. And emotions can vary in their intensities. (Remember, also, that one can be tired without feeling tired, one can be under pressure without feeling under pressure, and so on).

There are reasons, therefore, for thinking that it is possible for a person to be angry or frightened without having the feelings typically associated with it (Alston, pp. 483, 486). Here it is wise to go on a case by case basis. Yet as Melden has put it,

> "It may be that we need more than the occurrance of certain feelings as a warrant for the application of these concepts, but to be devoid of any feelings of the variety of sorts that go with the occurrence of these emotions would emphatically count against their application. For there are <u>feelings of anger</u> no less than <u>feeling that</u> one has received sufficient provocation, feelings of hostility and feelings <u>about</u> those with whom one is angry, no less then the feeling <u>that</u> one has been dealt with shabbily or with hostily, and what the present account of emotions as merely judgments leaves quite inexplicable is this central and essential connection between emotion and feeling." (Melden, p. 207)

Alston too has argued that we cannot identify emotions with judgments (or with entertaining a proposition) alone without completely losing contact with such phrases as "emotional reaction," "getting emotional over it," and "controlling one's emotions". Two people could judge a certain situation as equally dangerous, both could take steps to avert

the danger, but one person could be gripped with fear while the other could be calm. Even if two people who judge a certain situation as equally dangerous have some emotional reaction, they may differ in the intensity or degree of fright. These facts are sufficient to show that emotion can't merely be judgment or belief (Alston, p. 485). (See section V.D., V.E. below.)

Here the evidence seems to indicate that a moderately or fairly intense emotional state presumably has a certain kind of feeling, but in certain cases the person's attention or focus may be drawn away from noticing the feeling. With such an explanation in certain situations, it is still the case that the person has the emotion (e.g. is angry) even though he doesn't feel it (e.g. feel angry). Emotions, then, seem to differ in a striking way from pain-states, where it hardly seems possible that the person could be in pain when he is not aware of or does not feel pain.

B. A Behavioral Component

Over the past decades many have argued that emotional states include a behavioral component. For example, it has been argued that to frightened is to exhibit "running away" behavior or, at the least, the tendency to run away. Whatever the case about the dispositions frightened human beings may actually have, such a behavior condition is not a conceptual feature of being frightened. Here we can extend by analogy H. Putnam's arguments about being in pain. There is no conceptual oddity in conceiving of human beings who by various forms of training develop dispositions or tendencies other than the disposition to run away when they are frightened (Putnam, 1975; see also, Alston, p. 481; Gordon, 1980, p. 567; Rey, p. 179).

C. A Physiological Component

Some have argued that all components of emotions, such as beliefs (a form of cognition), feelings, and voluntary behavior might be thought of as physiological: all pretty surely involve activity in the nervous system and the straited muscalature (Rey, p. 179). Georges Rey has gone on to argue that there is no reason to suppose that our wondering about the nature of emotional states is any different, epistemologically, from our wondering about the nature of many seemingly natural kinds of phenomena, such as water. We want to discover the conditions whereby the phenomenon is the natural kind of phenomenon we take it to be, the conditions whereby all that we know about the phenomena hangs together, the conditions that, all things considered, can be regarded as defining the phenomenon (Rey, p. 186). Rey concluded that the portions of our physiology that do seem to be emerging as essential to emotional states are those involving the secretion of hormones and neuroregulators (p. 187). He went on to conclude that a being can have a human emotional life only if it has something like our system of hormones and neuroregulators (pp. 190-2) (see also Alston, pp. 485-6).

I shall not challenge or criticize the view that certain physiological features are correlated or causally related to having certain kinds of emotional states. Surely these are empirical regularities, necessities, or sufficiencies which only a trained scientist can establish or refute. What troubles me is taking such empirically related physiological features and regarding them as defining, essential, or conceptual features of emotional states. Following Melden we should say that the identification of an emotion is one thing; its alleged causal source in physiological factors is something else. And those who purport to discover the roots

of emotional states in certain physiological factors cannot without logical incoherence identify the emotion with such factors or regard the emotion as having such factors as a conceptually necessary features. Both the formulation of their theories and the adducing of empirical evidence in support of them presuppose not only that the concept of an emotional state cannot be elucidated in terms of these factors, but also that this concept, in its everyday employment, is sufficiently clear and coherent to serve as a basis of empirical investigation. This is not to rule out conceptual reconstruction, but conceptual reconstruction can always be purchased at the cost of irrelevance to our subject matter. And where it is necessary to do conceptual reconstruction, this fact should be clearly and openly acknowledged (Melden, p. 213).

Writers like Rey seem to exhibit a propensity to embrace something like a thorough going physicalistic view. A thorough going physicalist would want to identify these "emotional" properties with other, indubitably physical properties. But strict identity between such properties seems unattainable here. Mackie has argued that we can think of possible worlds in which the qualitative or phenomenal qualities are not associated with the physical properties on which they now rest, in which the cognitive and/or behavioral features are not associated with the physical properties on which they now rest. Mackie went on to argue that no reduction of the qualitative or phenomenal qualities is possible either (1976, pp. 168-9; see also 1975, pp. 51-2. See also Putnam, 1978, "Lectures IV, V, VI").

I conclude, therefore, that to regard a certain physiological feature as a conceptually necessary feature of emotional states is to

engage in conceptual legislation and reconstruction. Here we shall want to know why such legislation is needed and we shall want these facts to be openly and straightforwardly explained.

D. A Relational Component: The Belief Component Reconsidered

Some writers have argued that emotional states have a relational component. For example, it is impossible to feel indignation if one has not mastered the sense of justice. It is impossible to feel grief if one has never cared for the lost person (see Rey, Melden). It can't be doubted that some emotions have this relational feature to other emotional states, but it is far from clear that all emotional states have such a relational component.

One attempt to show that all emotions have a relational component was made by Robert Gordon. He suggested that all emotions include a cognitive and an attitudinal factor. For example, the emotion of anger satisfies the following requirement: "If S is angry about the fact that P, then S believes that P and wishes it not to be the case that P (Gordon, 1974, p. 32). Gordon used the term "wish" as a covering-term for all sorts of pro-attitudes, con-attitudes, wanting, and desiring that something be the case (p. 31). (See also Pitcher's use of "evaluation", p. 225. Notice also that "belief" is used as a covering-term for various kinds of cognitive states. See also Pitcher's use of "apprehension", p. 224).

Given my earlier remarks about nonpropositional believing, desiring, and hoping, let me construe Gordon's claims to allow for nonpropositional forms as well as propositional forms of emotions. His position then comes to this. If a person S is frightened by an object O, then S has a certain belief and S has a certain wish (desire or hope). Here the

believing and wishing can be either propositional or nonpropositional in form.

Incorporating such an attitudinal component in the concept of emotion will enable us to explain the kind and level of feeling which is typical of certain emotional states, especially dispositional emotions.

There seems to be, however, three difficulties for this kind of view. First, certain kinds of emotions--hope, envy, awe--seem not to have any characteristic feelings. Second, although the analysis seems appropriate for relatively long-term dispositional emotions, it is not clear that it is helpful for occurrent emotions. If it were to apply to occurrent emotions, being frightened must be construed as coming to holu certain beliefs while the attitudinal component remains fixed. But this seems unduly restrictive. Why not allow for relatively short-term longings, hopings, or wishings which, given the belief component remains fixed, accounts for the occurrent emotion.

The third difficulty for Gordon's view also presents problems for my earlier discussion about emotions involving belief. For there appear to be emotions, such as wishing, hoping, certain cases of desiring, and loving, where there is no need for an additional and separate belief component. For example, a person might wish for Joan the property of being successful, a person might desire for Joan the property of desiring him, and a person might love Joan. Whether the person believes that the wish is fulfilled or not, whether the person believes that the desire is satisfied or not, and whether the person believes that his love is returned or not seem to be additional questions which presuppose the person has the respective emotional state. Unlike fear where it is plausible to hold that a person must <u>believe</u> the situation to be harmful

to something the person cares about in order to be frightened, in certain cases of hoping, wishing, certain cases of desiring, and loving, no further belief is required in order for one to have that emotion. (See also Shaffer's essay on sexual desires.)

E. Tentative Conclusion: The Cognitive-Attitudinal Component

It is important to notice, however, that for these cases of emotions there are still cognitive features, even though the features aren't involved in a belief. Recall that in cases of attributional belief we may call the property (F) thus attributed the content of the indirect attribution, and the thing to which the property is attributed the object. Similarly in cases of nonpropositional wishing we may call the property (F) thus wished for the content and the thing (or person) to which the property is wished the object. Here again the wisher needs to have certain cognitive abilities or faculties. He needs to be able to take the other thing as his intentional objects, that is, to direct his thoughts upon the other, and he needs to be able to grasp or conceive a certain property which he wishes for the other. (See my earlier discussion.) And again, the object is picked out by a certain identifying relationship--the object is seen under a certain description for occurrent emotions.

I take it that Gordon has plausibly argued that certain emotional states, such a fear, grief, and so on, do essentially involve a belief component as well as an attitudinal component. But it seems that there are emotional states which involve essentially an attitudinal or "short-term" longing component, without a separate belief component. And such non-propositional emotions needn't be related to some other form of emotion.

I am inclined to believe that all occurrent emotional states must involve the attitudinal (or longing) component (which can be propositional or nonpropositional in form). But further work is need here. Further, I am inclined to believe that all occurrent emotional states must involve certain cognitive abilities and faculties, although this claim is tentative pending further work. Thus, given the above arguments, it seems plausible to conclude that all emotitons must nave a cognitive-attitudinal component, but that some emotions may have additional conceptual dimensions such as separate beliefs or relations to other emotions. (Recall my earlier remarks about Melden's work on the conceptual dimensions of emotion.) Nonetheless it is important to notice that this cognitive-attitudinal component can explain both the intentionality and the intensionality of particular cases of occurrent emotion.

VI. General Summary

In this essay I assumed that the concept of emotion is of great importance for educators. I devoted myself to the question logically prior to any reasonable discussion of the educational role and importance of emotion. I tried to get clear about the nature of emotion itself. I have began the conceptual analysis of the concept of emotion, the concept which is characteristic of adult human beings. I have also restricted my analysis to emotional states which are occurrent.

Of great importance are the facts that emotions are intentional and that they can be intensional. In a major part (section III) I explained and considered the relationship between intentionality and intensionality. I argued that intensionality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an emotion. I discussed why emotions can be appraised as reasonable (or unreasonable) and I explained the source of intensionality.

I concluded by arguing that some emotions have a propositional belief component, but that some emotions have a nonpropositional (or attributional) belief component.

In section IV, I drew several important distinctions: the distinction between the object of an emotion and its cause, the distinction between the identify of an emotion and its nature, and the distinction between the evidence for an ascription of an emotion and its nature.

Finally, in section V, I considered what are the conceptual components of emotion. Considered were (a) a qualitative or feeling component, (b) a behavioral component, (c) a physiological component, and (d) a relational component. As a tentative conclusion, I qualified my earlier remarks of section III and I argued that a cognitive-attitudinal component seems essential to occurrent emotional states. I argued that since emotions have such a component one can explain both the intentionality and the intensionality of emotions.

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